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In  the wake of  the 2007‐2009  financial crisis, continuing corporate debacles, and ongoing corporate‐
governance calls for the appointment of chief risk officers (CROs) and risk‐management committees, it is 
particularly  important  to  understand  what  role  risk  officers  (may)  play  in  organizational  life.  The 
compliance imperative requires banks to implement a firm‐wide risk management framework complete 
with  analytical  models  for  the  measurement  and  control  of  quantifiable  risks.  In  addition,  corporate 
governance  guidelines  advocate  the  “business  partner”  role  of  risk  management.  In  this  context,  the 
question becomes: how do  senior  risk officers  strike  a balance between  the  twin  roles of  “compliance 
champion” and ”business partner”? 






communicator of uncertainty,  capable of operating  as  a potential partner  to  business decision makers 
rather than as a reactive control agent.  
Seemingly,  risk  managers  are  riding  a  favorable  tide  with  regulators,  standard‐setters,  and  some 
emerging professional associations advocating their value. An increasing proportion of companies have 
appointed  CROs  over  the  last  decade,  and  surveys  demonstrate  that  the  proliferation  of  senior  risk 
officers  is  ubiquitous1.  While  only  a  minority  of  respondents  tend  to  treat  COSO’s  Enterprise  Risk 
Management (ERM) framework (COSO, 2004) as their blueprint, and many do not follow any particular 
standard or  framework2,  surveys generally agree  that  the numbers of  companies  embracing ERM  (i.e. 
reporting  to have “an ERM  framework and/or an ERM policy”) have reached  the “critical mass of 60% 






risk management  practices  and  tools. At worst,  risk management  (or  the  appointment  of CROs)  is  a 
faddish phenomenon,  taking up  increasing  amounts of  resources yet proving  incapable of  closing  the 
















brought  about  their  version  of  risk  management.  Having  traced  the  evolution  of  these  two  risk‐
management functions, their apparatus (tools and processes), and their relationship with the rest of the 
organization,  I was  struck,  first, by  the apparent  success of  these CROs at making  risk management a 
seemingly inevitable, inconspicuous part of organizational life. Over the years, they developed new tools 
that seamlessly linked up with the work of business managers, creating the impression that the real work 
of  risk management  took place  in  the  business  lines,  and was  carried  out  by  employees. Yet  the  risk 
managers  (or  rather,  the  risk‐function  managers)  retained  a  certain  amount  of  attachment  to  these 
practices that enabled them to demarcate risk management as their expertise and raison d’etre.   
Secondly,  I was also  intrigued by  the paradoxical attitudes displayed by  these CROs  towards  their 




and  the  “charlatans”  who  advocated  them.  They  took  on  the  challenge  to  develop  the  idea  of  risk 
management  and  its  apparatus  themselves.  Yet  at  the  same  time,  they  displayed  a  lot  of  humility, 
acknowledging failures, struggles and imperfections. They regarded their work unfinished.  
Thirdly,  these CROs  sensed  that  the excessive use of certain kinds of  risk‐management vocabulary, 
technology,  and  their uncritical  adaption  could  harm,  rather  than  further  their  cause.  Irritated  by  the 
proliferation  of  abstract  vocabulary  emanating  from  risk‐management  standards,  these CROs  tried  to 
learn and speak the language of the business. By co‐creating risk tools and a sparse risk vocabulary with 




further  “investment  in  risk management”,  and  did  not  ask  for  increases  in  their  formal  authority  or 
decision  rights. Towards  the  end of  the  research horizon, at both  companies  the  role of  the CRO was 





the‐shelf  IT  programs  that  promise  a  comprehensive  and  elaborate  display  of  risks.  The  following 
sections aim to describe the movements of this evolution, as evidenced by the case studies. I start with a 
brief description of  the  case  sites  and  the  research process. Second,  I outline  the  evolution of  the  risk 
apparatus  and  describe  the  work  of  risk  management  (“riskwork”)  at  the  two  companies.  Third,  I 
describe their efforts at facilitating inconspicuous risk talk and unobtrusive risk tools. Next, I illustrate the 
mix  of  confidence  and  humility  that  characterized  the  attitude  of  these  CROs  towards  their  own 
creations. Here  I shall also describe how  these CROs kept  their span of control  (Simons, 2005) narrow, 
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and even came  to accept  less  formal authority, while  (somewhat  counterintuitively)  they  succeeded at 
widening their span of support4.  
The case sites and research process 
Electroworks,  a major Canadian power utility, operated  in  an  industry  in which  lack of  reliability 
could  lead not only  to  financial and asset damage but also  to human  injury and death. The provincial 
regulatory agency had capped  the price  that Electroworks could charge, while also requiring  it  to  lead 
conservation initiatives that would reduce future revenues and earnings. Electroworks had to manage a 
complex  web  of  conflicting  interests—the  agendas  of  government  ministers,  regulators,  consumers, 
environmental groups, aboriginal  (“first nation”)  landowners, and  the capital‐market debt‐holders  that 




Magic Toys was a  large,  family‐owned  toymaker, operating within a highly competitive,  fast‐paced 
industry, which  essentially  produces  and markets  “fashion  for  kids”.  The majority  of  the  company’s 
annual sales came from new product  launches, which elevated the  importance of product development 
and innovation. The firm’s primary customers were the global retailers who distributed children’s toys. 
Serving  these  retail  chains with  accurate  and  timely deliveries,  and  ensuring  their  fast  shelf‐turnover 
were of paramount  importance  in Magic Toys’ business model, which aspired  to possess “world‐class” 
marketing and distribution capabilities. In this context, risk management’s role was to assist the smooth 
delivery of new product  lines  (each carried out as a separate project) and  to “prepare  the company  for 
uncertainty”. I started field work at Magic Toys in 2010, and through 44 interviews (see Appendix 2 for a 
list of interviews) with risk‐function managers and business executives, I tried to sketch the evolution of 




Early  1999,  in  preparation  for  listing  on  the  Toronto  Stock  Exchange,  the  board  of  directors  at 
Electroworks  decided  that  the  company  should  implement  enterprise  risk  management  (ERM),  in 












sense of need  conveyed by  the board and  the  listing  requirements. Originally hired  from  the banking 





















turnover  and  the  appointment  of  the  company’s  first  ever  “outside”  CEO  (a  former  McKinsey 

























Over  time, Lewis  introduced  a  three‐phase  enterprise  risk management program,  consisting of  risk 
workshops, bi‐annual  risk updates and,  linked  to  the annual planning process,  risk‐based  resource allocation. 
The following timeline summarizes the evolution of these phases.  














































































In  2008,  responding  the  global  financial  crisis  and  a world‐wide  concern with  systemic  risks  and  
“black swan” events8, Lewis and his team initiated so‐called “black swan workshops,” a separate process 
to  focus executives’ and board members’ attention on  low‐probability high‐impact events  that did not 
normally come up during risk workshops and the bi‐annual risk updates. These discussions used a new 






























































Our  original  ambitious  plan  was  to  do  twelve  risk  assessments  a  year.  The  senior  executive  team 
embraced the approach so enthusiastically that one year we did 60 different risk assessment workshops.  My 



















to vote a 4.” Each person  in the room  identifies a different  impact, based on his or her area of expertise. It 
brings a lot of clarity.   
Having  co‐created  the  language  of  risk  assessments  with  the  business  lines,  Lewis  also  co‐opted 
business managers in setting the agenda for the risk workshops. Prior to each risk workshop, Lewis’ risk 
team  informally polled participants and drew up a generic  list of 60–70 potential risks or threats to the 
business  or  the project  being discussed. They  e‐mailed  the  list  to  the participating management  team 
asking them to choose the ten most critical risks facing their business or project. Based on these choices 












All  three  phases  of  ERM  at  Electroworks  channeled  risk  information  vertically  and  horizontally 
throughout the company, enabling executives and employees to develop a shared understanding of what 
risks  the  company  faced and what had  to be done about  them.  Indeed, by 2008, Lewis noted  that  the 























































































looking, charming, very knowledgeable, who became a very good  [workshop]  facilitator. The  third one  is a person 










By 2003, ERM at Electroworks was sufficiently established so  that Lewis could  judge  it as a success 






Having  examined  several  software  packages  and  attended  consultants’  presentations  on  risk 




Hirschman  continuously  wheedled  and  cajoled  business  managers  to  send  updates  on  risks  and 
actions. He never used fiat and never referenced the ERM policy documents – he appeared permissive, 

































rather  than  constraining  aspect,  and  he  put  it  in writing  in  a  series  of  papers  and  book  chapters  co‐
authored  by  a  business‐school  academic.  Contradicting  the  corporate  governance  advocates  and 
guidelines  that  considered  risk management  as  a  “line  of  defense”  in  the  internal  control  landscape, 
Hirschman emphasized that the role of the risk management function was to support, rather than control 
managers:   








Workshop  Facilitator  and  a  Data  Manager),  its  reach  impacted  much  of  the  organization  though 
workshops, the annual planning and the bi‐annual updates. Lewis and team were quick to acknowledge 
that despite  their perceived  successes,  their  full vision  for ERM was never accomplished, and perhaps 
will never be. Lewis summarized his “theoretical dream” as the “risk dashboard”  ‐ a software‐enabled, 
computerized version of his risk reports, accessible anytime by any senior manager, providing up‐to‐date 
and  fast graphic displays of all risk  information, summarized  into colourful risk maps and Top 10 risk 
lists, with drill‐down capability into individual items. But Lewis was conscious that Electroworks did not 
have the “systems”, skill set or “culture” to implement such a model. 
Upon Lewis’  retirement  in 2012, Electroworks did not  recruit a new CRO  ‐  the previous Workshop 
Facilitator  (Larry  White12)  became  Director  of  Enterprise  Risk  Management  (and  no  longer  reported 




































letting  them  run  the  show, and  by  limiting  scenario planning  to  a half‐day workshop  for  each  team, we got  the 
proverbial foot in the door. 
The risk team also made it clear that their role was merely facilitating, not advising. Lynne Matte, who 
was  a  former  project  manager,  had  to  actively  fight  a  natural  enough  inclination  to  become  more 
directive: “As a risk manager, you should never  take over  [the discussion]. Even  if you know  the solution, keep 
your mouth shut.” Hirschman added: “It’s their decision, it’s their perception, it’s their risk. If I started to advise 
or correct them, I would start owning the stuff, and I can’t do that.” 
Hirschman  saw  risk  management  as  “commons  sense”,  and  highlighted  the  importance  of 
“understanding the business and the industry”. He was careful not to take any credit for the successes of 
the  business.  Commenting  on  Magic  Toys  eventual  success  at  exceeding  its  2013  sales  targets,  he 
concluded:  










the  ears  of  the  board  and  senior  management.  This  remained  the  case  even  when  a  management 
reorganization  left  the  CRO  with  a  reporting  line  to  the  Treasurer  (who  then  reported  to  the  CFO). 
Though formally the CRO was “4 steps removed” from the board of directors, by 2013 he established a 
process that shaped the discussion of every business plan, and the biannual board meetings.  































































of  the  humble CRO  is  not  so much  in  her  ability  to  go  “beyond  the  compliance  role”  or  turn  into  a 

















































































































































Net Income  Net Income Shortfall 
(after tax, in one year)  
>$150M $75M–$150M $25M–$75M  $5M–$25M  <$5M  
Credit Worthiness  Change in financial ratios or 
risk  
Event of default; 
Unable to raise any capital due 
to credit rating. 
Credit rating downgrade to 
below investment grade; 
Unable to raise full amount 
required capital. 
Credit rating downgrade.  Hydro One Inc. put on credit 
"watch".  
Credit rating agencies and 
bondholders express concern.  
Value of the Enterprise  Loss in Value of Hydro One  Loss of >25% Value Loss of 10–25% Value Loss of 5-10% Value  Loss of 1-5% Value  Loss of <1% Value  
REPUTATION  
Public Profile  Negative media attention;  
Opinion leader and public 
Criticism  
National media attention;  
Opinion leaders/customers 
nearly unanimous in public 
criticism. 
Provincial media attention;  
Most opinion leaders/ 
customers publicly critical. 
Significant local attention;  
Several opinion leaders/ 
customers publicly critical.  
Letter(s) to Minister  
of Energy.  
Letter(s) to Senior 
Management.  
Shareholder confidence  Owner/ shareholder 
involvement in Hydro One 
operations 
Complete loss of confidence;  
CEO and Board replaced by 
the owner. 
Extensive loss of confidence;  
CEO or several Sr. Managers 
replaced. 
Credit Rating agencies and 
bondholders express concern.  
Confidence in question; owner 
requests significant changes to 
business plan. 
Some concern with 
management decisions; 
occasional requests from 
owner for details.  
 
Employee confidence  Employee Dissatisfaction  Widespread departures of key 
staff with scarce skills or 
knowledge. 
Sharp, sustained drop in 
employee survey results; 
departures of key staff with 
scarce skills or knowledge. 
Sharp decline in employee 
survey results; sharp increase 
in grievances.  
Modest decline in employee 
survey results; modest 
increase in grievances.  
Less than planned 
improvements in employee 
survey results.  
REGULATORY 
RELATIONSHIP  
Meet License Conditions  Loss of Credibility with 
Regulators  
General loss of Credibility; 
Intrusive Involvement. 
Some loss of Credibility; 
Excessive Involvement. 
Some Concerns re: 
Competence; Difficult 
Demands.  
Increase in Reporting Detail 
and Frequency.  
Balanced; some challenges.  
CUSTOMER/ 
RELIABILITY  
Reliable Delivery of 
Electricity  





>1000MW Transmission for 
more than seven days. 
Outage affects:  
40k-100k Customers 
Distribution or  
400–1000 MW Transmission 
for 4–7 days. 
Outage affects:  
10k–40k Customers 
Distribution or  
100–400MW Transmission for 
2–4 days.  
Outage affects:  
1k–10k Customers Distribution 
or  
10–100MW Transmission for 
4–24 hrs.  
Outage affects:  
<1000 Customers Distribution 
or 
 <10MW Transmission for <4 
Hrs.  
OEB Service Quality Indices  Failure to Meet Service Quality 
Indices   
Achieve 25% of Overall 
Expected Performance. 
Achieve 67% of Overall 
Expected Performance. 
Achieve 80% of Overall 
Expected Performance. 
Achieve 90% of Overall 
Expected Performance.  
Achieve 95% of Overall 
Expected Performance.  
Direct Customers, Local 
Distribution Companies, 
Generators  
Increase in customer 
dissatisfaction with Hydro One  
Numerous Direct Customers 
initiate action such as bypass 
or relocation; Numerous LDC's 
default on bill payments; 
Generator reluctance to locate 
in Ontario leads to shortages. 
Exponential increase in 
customer lawsuits for direct 
and/or collateral damage 
believed to be caused by 
Hydro One; Complaints to 
provincial government 
increase dramatically. 
Customer associations step up 
lobbying efforts for stricter 
penalties against Hydro One.  
One "large" customer 
experiences significant 
production losses due to 
Hydro One actions/inaction; 
high level (CEO, COO, etc.) 
calls to Hydro One CEO's 
office.  
Increase in number of 
customer complaints.  
Residential and Small 
Business Customers  
Increase in customer 
dissatisfaction with Hydro One 
service quality  
Significant numbers of 
customers begin to default on 
bill payments. 
Exponential (>50%) increase 
in call centre volumes and 
complaints received by field 
staff. 
Call centre volumes increase 
noticeably (25%); noticeable 
increase in complaints 
received by field staff.  
Sharp deterioration in 
customer satisfaction as per 
survey responses.  
Moderate deterioration in 
customer satisfaction as per 
survey responses.  
COMPETITIVENESS  
Unit Cost Reduction  Failure to Reduce Unit Costs 
(incl. overhead & non-billable 
time)  
Unit Costs increase by >25% Unit Costs increase by 15%–
25% 
Unit Costs increase by 10% - 
15%  
Unit Costs increase by 5% 
10%  
Unit costs not reduced  
Work Program 
Accomplishment  
Work Program Shortfall  >10 Critical Projects late or; 
<50% of noncritical work 
completed. 
5-10 Critical Projects late or 
50%–70% of noncritical work 
completed. 
3–5 Critical Projects late or 
70%–85% of non critical work 
completed.  
1-3 Critical Projects late or 
>85% of non critical work 
completed.  
No Critical Projects late 





Availability/ Safety  
Change in availability (%) in 
one year; Accident Severity 
Rate.  
Key functions/locations 
unavailable > 1 week; 
Employee fatality or major 
permanent disability. 
Key functions/locations 
unavailable > 1day; 
Employee critical injury. 
Accident Severity Rate > 50% 
above target.  
Accident Severity Rate > 25% 
above target.  
Accident Severity Rate above 
target. 
Environmental Performance  Adverse Environmental Impact  Widespread offsite impacts  
e.g., regional or municipal 
water supply. 
Multiple local offsite impacts  
e.g., multiple residential 
properties or private water 
supplies. 
Significant local offsite impact 
e.g., a public thoroughfare; 
Significant spill/release with 
impact on Hydro One Inc. 
property only  
Minor local offsite impact  
e.g., a single residential 
property or private water 
supply). 
Minor impact on Hydro One 
Inc. property only.  
Public Safety  Public Injuries with Hydro One 
at fault.  
Fatality or major permanent 
disability. 
Significant increase in number 
of injuries. 
Moderate increase in number 
of injuries.  
Small increase in number of 
injuries.  
No change.  
  
 
